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How Clinton Used Russia’s 1993 Disaster to Dupe Yeltsin on NATO’s Eastward March
How Clinton Used Russia’s 1993 Disaster to Dupe Yeltsin on NATO’s Eastward March
This week marks the thirtieth anniversary of the bloody finale to the 1993 Russian Constitutional Disaster – which noticed the streets of Moscow became a… 03.10.2023, Sputnik Worldwide
2023-10-03T19:01+0000
2023-10-03T19:01+0000
2023-10-03T19:33+0000
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Within the early morning hours of October 4, 1993, Russian safety forces loyal to President Boris Yeltsin surrounded the Russian parliament constructing – the place Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, parliamentary chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, a whole bunch of rebellious Supreme Soviet lawmakers, and extraordinary residents against the Yeltsin authorities and its political and financial reform agenda had been holed up. Professional-Yeltsin forces made preparations to storm the constructing after the brewing constitutional disaster turned violent on the evening of October 3, as supporters of the Supreme Soviet made an try and take over the Ostankino Tv Middle.At 7 am, flares had been lit, signaling the beginning of an operation to storm the constructing and smoke lawmakers out, with armored personnel carriers ramming by way of makeshift barricades alongside the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment, and tanks rumbling down Kutuzovsky Prospect, positioning themselves on Novoarbatsky Bridge and firing into the constructing, as Military and particular forces models peppered it with small arms hearth.By mid-day, with the parliament constructing closely broken and on hearth, and dozens of its defenders killed and a whole bunch wounded, the leaders of the anti-Yeltsin riot introduced readiness to put down their arms to stop additional bloodshed and escape sure loss of life.What Triggered the Constitutional Disaster?The October disaster, additionally known as Black October, was the fruits of a political twin energy disaster which started to take form within the instant aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The Yeltsin authorities’s Western-supported ‘shock remedy’ financial reform agenda, which impoverished tens of tens of millions of Russians in a single day, plus his makes an attempt to consolidate increasingly energy into the palms of the presidency, met with rising opposition from the parliamentary majority. Underneath the political system that Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet inherited, lawmakers maintained important powers to dam, stall, sabotage or at water down reforms, making the October disaster all however an inevitable in the long term.On September 21, 1993, after greater than a year-and-a-half of bitter back-and-forth wrangling for energy with the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin appealed to the nation on tv and issued Decree No. 1400 – ordering the dissolution of parliament and scheduling elections to the State Duma – a brand new parliamentary organ meant to switch the Supreme Soviet, for December 1993.Underneath the structure, Yeltsin didn’t even have the authority “to dissolve or intervene with the functioning of any elected organs of state energy,” with the doc making clear in no unsure phrases that if he tried to take action, his powers would “stop instantly.”Hundreds of Muscovites and folks from throughout Russia descended onto the streets of Moscow to indicate their help for the Supreme Soviet, with Yeltsin’s backers staging their very own gatherings, and road protests usually turning into violent confrontations between demonstrators and riot police. Electrical energy, heating, meals deliveries and different facilities to the Supreme Soviet had been lower off, with the constructing blockaded by safety forces loyal to the president.America’s Position Through the CrisisThe fall 1993 disaster posed a serious menace to Washington – which had simply gained a agency buddy within the determine of Boris Yeltsin after the collapse of the USSR, and didn’t wish to lose him, or worse, see the return to energy of communist and/or radicalized patriotic forces threatening US plans for Russia and Japanese Europe.In 2018, the Clinton Presidential Library launched a big trove of transcripts of conversations between Yeltsin and President Invoice Clinton, revealing, amongst different issues, the dramatic extent to which Washington sought to manage Moscow by way of the reform course of from the very best degree, whereas concurrently benefiting from Russia’s political, financial and army weak point to push by way of the Clinton White Home’s NATO enlargement agenda.On September 21, 1993, the identical day that Yeltsin issued Decree No. 1400, he and Clinton spoke by cellphone, with the US president assuring his Russian counterpart that he had Washington’s full “help,” and asking how the hardline measures would have an effect on Yeltsin’s “place and the method of reform in Russia.”“Invoice, the Supreme Soviet has completely gone uncontrolled. It now not helps the reform course of. They’ve turn into communist. We can’t now not put up with that [sic],” Yeltsin stated, confirming that efficient instantly and till the December vote, Russia could be dominated “by presidential decree.”“All democratic forces are supporting me,” Yeltsin assured.“I intend to be in contact with our allies in Europe and Asia to underscore the significance of help for reform in Russia at this vital juncture. I simply wish to say once more that you should have my help and the help of the American folks,” Clinton stated, including {that a} $2.5 billion help package deal was within the works.Particulars Nonetheless Shrouded in Mystery30 years on from the occasions of fall of 1993, some essential particulars surrounding the clashes between the pro-Yeltsin safety forces and defenders of the Supreme Soviet stay murky. For instance, in line with official tallies, between October 3-4, the violence on the Supreme Soviet and the Ostankino Tv Middle claimed the lives of 158 folks (together with 130 civilians and 28 army personnel and police), with 750+ folks wounded. However tallies by Russian journalists and historians put the loss of life toll a lot greater, with some estimates of fatalities of 1,500 or extra folks.One other ‘clean spot’ in occasions surrounding Black October relate to the mysterious, never-identified snipers who took half within the violence, together with quite a few stories over time that the bloodshed might have really been unleashed by sharpshooters firing from the rooftops of the American Embassy, located about 500 meters from the parliament constructing. Russian safety service sources and parliamentarians cited by historians, documentary filmmakers and even a couple of authorities officers have indicated that fireside coming from the rooftops of the Embassy focused safety personnel, White Home defenders and even civilians, with the attainable goal of “stir[ring] up a riot and incit[ing] fratricidal struggle” inside Russia.Yeltsin’s After Motion Report back to ClintonOn October 5, whereas the Supreme Soviet constructing was nonetheless smoldering, and the streets round it had been cleaned of smashed barricades, rubble, wreckage and blood, the Russian and US presidents held a second phone name, wherein Clinton reiterated his shut help for Yeltsin, and burdened that he had adopted the occasions “carefully.”“Invoice, thanks very a lot on your help, which I knew and felt could be coming. Now that these occasions are over, we’ve no extra obstacles to Russia’s democratic elections and our transition to democracy and a market economic system. The fascist organizations that had been energetic in these occasions have now been banned, so now I really feel that every one shall be wonderful. It’s too dangerous that some folks had been killed, however that is the fault of those that had been the primary to open hearth and acted in a provocative method,” Yeltsin stated, pointing the finger squarely on the Supreme Soviet’s defenders.Yeltsin assured that he had restored full management over the state of affairs, and that regional leaders, together with those that had expressed help for Rutskoy, had been “altering their help to us,” with the courts to resolve what punishments to mete out to the rebellious lawmakers.Alternative for NATOBoth earlier than and instantly after the October disaster, the USA took benefit of Yeltsin’s home political weak point to flirt brazenly with the concept of NATO enlargement towards Russia’s borders. Moscow’s efforts to cozy as much as Washington towards formal “alliance” standing had been first rebuked by Clinton’s predecessor, George H.W. Bush, who clarified in February 1992, simply weeks after the Soviet collapse, that the Russian-US relationship could be considered one of “friendship,” not alliance.“I inform you plainly that we favor a special method, one which results in a very pan-European safety system, an method predicated on collective (however not on the premise of bloc membership) actions to stop and resolve the crises and conflicts that now have Europe in turmoil. Safety should be indivisible and should be primarily based on pan-European buildings,” Yeltsin added.“The first menace to Europe is now posed, not by confrontation between East and West however by a brand new era of inter-ethnic conflicts. Quantitative enlargement of NATO will hardly resolve the issue of the best way to counteract these conflicts successfully. What must be carried out is to reinforce disaster prevention and peacemaking on a totally continental scale,” the Russian president argued.Yeltsin additionally warned that whereas he personally didn’t see potential NATO enlargement as an automated indication of the alliance “turning towards Russia,” it was “essential to have in mind how our public opinion would possibly react to such a step. Not solely the opposition, however reasonable circles as effectively, would little doubt understand this as a form of neo-isolation of our nation in diametric opposition to its pure admission into the Euro-Atlantic house,” he wrote.In late October, a number of weeks after the Supreme Soviet’s riot was routed, Clinton Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Moscow to assuage Yeltsin’s issues, assuring him that “the method for future new membership in [NATO] was inclusive and non-discriminatory,” and that the Partnership for Peace – a NATO initiative designed to ramp up diplomatic cooperation with nations in Japanese Europe and Scandinavia, could be an alternative choice to NATO enlargement, not a precursor to it.“That is genius!” a relieved Yeltsin exclaimed, saying the “sensible concept” would be certain that Russia wouldn’t be handled like a “second-class citizen” however be “equal companions” with the West.Christopher later claimed that Yeltsin didn’t seem to grasp him, probably as a result of he was inebriated, and alleged that Yeltsin’s overseas minister, Andrei Kozyrev, failed to elucidate to the Russian president that the Partnership for Peace might certainly finally result in NATO membership.Weeks after the December 1993 elections, Clinton lastly addressed the NATO enlargement problem personally in a cellphone name with Yeltsin.“Can I make one different level?” Clinton requested close to the shut of their lengthy December 22, 1993 dialog after chewing the fats about elections, the brand new Russian parliamentary system, financial reforms and Western help. “Please do,” Yeltsin stated.“It’s about our overseas coverage agenda. I shall be in Brussels for the NATO Summit and in Prague earlier than I see you and can wish to focus on Russian participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace proposal,” Clinton stated.“I hope we will agree on cooperative efforts to dispel these fears…It will likely be essential to allay issues by producing concrete motion on Ukraine nuclear points and in addition on the Baltics. I don’t know the place you’re on that, however I believe it will be a great way to exhibit the optimistic modifications you may have already delivered to Russian overseas coverage,” the US president stated.Clinton didn’t reply on to Yeltsin’s level about attainable Russian membership within the alliance, easily shifting the dialog to a different subject.In January 1994, earlier than his go to to Moscow, Clinton met with leaders of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, confirming that the Partnership for Peace program was merely a “observe that may result in NATO membership.”NATO Enlargement ‘Sows Seeds of Distrust’By the tip of that yr, lastly totally cottoned on to Washington’s plans to include Japanese Europe, however not Russia, into the bloc, Yeltsin requested Clinton level black on the Convention on Safety and Cooperation in Europe summit in December 1994 why the US had chosen to sow “the seeds of distrust.”“Europe is at risk of plunging into a chilly peace. Historical past demonstrates that it’s a harmful phantasm to suppose that the destinies of continents and the world group normally can one way or the other be managed from one single capital,” Yeltsin stated.Yeltsin repeated his opposition to alliance enlargement a number of occasions after that. Washington ignored the complaints, formally asserting plans to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO in 1997. The enlargement, warned towards by high US overseas coverage minds, together with containment doctrine guru George Kennan, laid the muse for Russian-US mistrust, finally culminating within the Ukrainian disaster and NATO’s proxy struggle towards Russia utilizing Kiev.In April 2022 in a column in The Atlantic, Clinton retroactively tried to whitewash his position in fomenting the battle in Ukraine, claiming that all through the Nineteen Nineties and early 2000s, “we left the door open for Russia’s eventual membership in NATO.”“The concept that we ignored, disrespected, or tried to isolate Russia is fake. Sure, NATO expanded regardless of Russia’s objections, however enlargement was about greater than the US relationship with Russia,” Clinton wrote. The previous president went on to quote Russia’s particular army operation in Ukraine as “proof” that he made the suitable name, ignoring Washington’s express dedication to Moscow to not develop “one inch east” of a reunified Germany in 1990.NATO’s Expansionism: A Historic Inevitability?Dr. Matthew Crosston, a professor of nationwide safety at Bowie State College, informed Sputnik that sadly, the palpable optimistic “power and pleasure” skilled by many Russians and extraordinary People after the tip of the Chilly Battle shortly took a again seat to plans by Washington policymakers to “maximize” as a lot as attainable “the truth of what was thought-about the best historic victory ever achieved by the USA.”“There was a really well-known article written round this time interval by Francis Fukuyama, entitled ‘The Finish of Historical past.’ Its principal de facto premise was that the best ideological competitors had concluded and democracy had received, thus signaling no different critical ideological competitions available. It was the tip of historical past and the final word victor was American democracy. This wasn’t precisely what Fukuyama meant, after all. But it surely was the conclusion that Washington took from the article and lived with just about to this present day. Definitely, that mentality dominated the whole 90s when it got here to how the USA acted towards the ‘new’ Russian Federation: we received; you misplaced. From this level ahead, your greatest path, Russia, is just following the recommendation we give you and do precisely as we inform you,” Dr. Crosston defined.Yeltsin, Crosston believes, “clearly needed one of the best for Russia and needed to create a brand new relationship dynamic between the USA and his nation,” however quickly realized that “the US was not going to work with him to make it attainable to craft a very model new and profoundly totally different relationship between the supposedly former rivals.” The previous Russian president “really believed if he open-heartedly embraced a cooperative relationship with America that the US would reciprocate and never take benefit. That perception was sadly considerably naïve, and it was manipulated by a few of his closest advisors inside his personal Kremlin group,” in line with the observer.In the end, the educational emphasised that NATO’s prevailing doctrine after the Chilly Battle revolved across the concept of “maintaining Russia an enemy,” with the “previous mind-set” inflicting “the least disruption to present institutional bureaucracies” in Washington.
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russia, moscow, washington, boris yeltsin, nato, kremlin, white home
Within the early morning hours of October 4, 1993, Russian safety forces loyal to President Boris Yeltsin surrounded the Russian parliament constructing – the place Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, parliamentary chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov, a whole bunch of rebellious Supreme Soviet lawmakers, and extraordinary residents against the Yeltsin authorities and its political and financial reform agenda had been holed up. Professional-Yeltsin forces made preparations to storm the constructing after the brewing constitutional disaster turned violent on the evening of October 3, as supporters of the Supreme Soviet made an try and take over the Ostankino Tv Middle.
At 7 am, flares had been lit, signaling the beginning of an operation to storm the constructing and smoke lawmakers out, with armored personnel carriers ramming by way of makeshift barricades alongside the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment, and tanks rumbling down Kutuzovsky Prospect, positioning themselves on Novoarbatsky Bridge and firing into the constructing, as Military and particular forces models peppered it with small arms hearth.
By mid-day, with the parliament constructing closely broken and on hearth, and dozens of its defenders killed and a whole bunch wounded, the leaders of the anti-Yeltsin riot introduced readiness to put down their arms to stop additional bloodshed and escape sure loss of life.
What Triggered the Constitutional Disaster?
The October disaster, additionally known as Black October, was the fruits of a political twin energy disaster which started to take form within the instant aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The Yeltsin authorities’s Western-supported ‘shock remedy’ financial reform agenda, which impoverished tens of tens of millions of Russians in a single day, plus his makes an attempt to consolidate increasingly energy into the palms of the presidency, met with rising opposition from the parliamentary majority. Underneath the political system that Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet inherited, lawmakers maintained important powers to dam, stall, sabotage or at water down reforms, making the October disaster all however an inevitable in the long term.
On September 21, 1993, after greater than a year-and-a-half of bitter back-and-forth wrangling for energy with the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin appealed to the nation on tv and issued Decree No. 1400 – ordering the dissolution of parliament and scheduling elections to the State Duma – a brand new parliamentary organ meant to switch the Supreme Soviet, for December 1993.
The Supreme Soviet knew this, issuing a decision denouncing Decree No. 1400 as unconstitutional, accusing Yeltsin of attempting to hold out a “coup d’état,” stripping him of energy and appointing VP Rutskoy as appearing president. The Constitutional Court docket backed the lawmakers. Rutskoy moved to dismiss Yeltsin’s safety, protection and inside affairs ministers, and started lobbying for help amongst Russia’s regional authorities, which cut up between backing Yeltsin (who loved sturdy help in Moscow) and supporting Rutskoy (who was backed by areas hit hardest by the shock remedy reforms).
Hundreds of Muscovites and folks from throughout Russia descended onto the streets of Moscow to indicate their help for the Supreme Soviet, with Yeltsin’s backers staging their very own gatherings, and road protests usually turning into violent confrontations between demonstrators and riot police. Electrical energy, heating, meals deliveries and different facilities to the Supreme Soviet had been lower off, with the constructing blockaded by safety forces loyal to the president.
America’s Position Through the Disaster
The autumn 1993 disaster posed a serious menace to Washington – which had simply gained a agency buddy within the determine of Boris Yeltsin after the collapse of the USSR, and didn’t wish to lose him, or worse, see the return to energy of communist and/or radicalized patriotic forces threatening US plans for Russia and Japanese Europe.
On September 21, 1993, the identical day that Yeltsin issued Decree No. 1400, he and Clinton spoke by cellphone, with the US president assuring his Russian counterpart that he had Washington’s full “help,” and asking how the hardline measures would have an effect on Yeltsin’s “place and the method of reform in Russia.”
“Invoice, the Supreme Soviet has completely gone uncontrolled. It now not helps the reform course of. They’ve turn into communist. We can’t now not put up with that [sic],” Yeltsin stated, confirming that efficient instantly and till the December vote, Russia could be dominated “by presidential decree.”
“All democratic forces are supporting me,” Yeltsin assured.
“Are the army and safety providers with you?” Clinton requested cautiously. “Each the army and the Ministry of Inside Affairs have come out in help of me. There isn’t a dysfunction in the meanwhile. There are about 300 folks gathered however they’re dispersing. I believe there shall be no bloodshed,” Yeltsin stated.
“I intend to be in contact with our allies in Europe and Asia to underscore the significance of help for reform in Russia at this vital juncture. I simply wish to say once more that you should have my help and the help of the American folks,” Clinton stated, including {that a} $2.5 billion help package deal was within the works.
“The reforms will go a lot quicker now than previously. The Supreme Soviet hindered reforms previously. And thanks on your help. The Russian folks is not going to overlook,” Yeltsin replied. “The opposition will strive to not acknowledge what has occurred. However the folks will perceive all of this, particularly the intelligentsia. We don’t wish to use power. The whole lot will happen peacefully. We don’t in any circumstances need bloodshed,” he added.
3 October 2012, 10:04 GMT
Details Still Shrouded in Mystery
3 October 2018, 15:28 GMT
Yeltsin’s After Action Report to Clinton
On October 5, while the Supreme Soviet building was still smoldering, and the streets around it were cleaned of smashed barricades, rubble, wreckage and blood, the Russian and US presidents held a second telephone call, in which Clinton reiterated his close support for Yeltsin, and stressed that he had followed the events “closely.”
“Bill, thank you very much for your support, which I knew and felt would be coming. Now that these events are over, we have no more obstacles to Russia’s democratic elections and our transition to democracy and a market economy. The fascist organizations that had been active in these events have now been banned, so now I feel that all will be fine. It’s too bad that some people were killed, but this is the fault of those who were the first to open fire and acted in a provocative way,” Yeltsin said, pointing the finger squarely at the Supreme Soviet’s defenders.
Yeltsin assured that he had restored full control over the situation, and that regional leaders, including those who had expressed support for Rutskoy, were “changing their support to us,” with the courts to decide what punishments to mete out to the rebellious lawmakers.
“I hope you’ll be able to get some rest now. I know it has been very hard for you, but you did everything exactly as you had to and I congratulate you for the way you handled it,” Clinton said, expressing eagerness over his planned visit to Moscow in January 1994. “Thank you for everything. I embrace you with all my heart,” Yeltsin replied.
Opportunity for NATO
“I cannot help but express our uneasiness as well over the fact that the discussion of how NATO might evolve is centering with increasing frequency on the scenario of quantitative expansion of the alliance by adding East European countries,” Yeltsin told Clinton in a letter delivered September 15, 1993, exactly a week before the constitutional crisis began.
“I tell you plainly that we favor a different approach, one that leads to a truly pan-European security system, an approach predicated on collective (but not on the basis of bloc membership) actions to prevent and resolve the crises and conflicts that now have Europe in turmoil. Security must be indivisible and must be based on pan-European structures,” Yeltsin added.
“The primary threat to Europe is now posed, not by confrontation between East and West but by a new generation of inter-ethnic conflicts. Quantitative expansion of NATO will hardly solve the problem of how to counteract these conflicts effectively. What needs to be done is to augment crisis prevention and peacemaking on a fully continental scale,” the Russian president argued.
Yeltsin also warned that while he personally did not see potential NATO expansion as an automatic indication of the alliance “turning against Russia,” it was “important to take into account how our public opinion might react to such a step. Not only the opposition, but moderate circles as well, would no doubt perceive this as a sort of neo-isolation of our country in diametric opposition to its natural admission into the Euro-Atlantic space,” he wrote.
“This is genius!” a relieved Yeltsin exclaimed, saying the “brilliant idea” would ensure that Russia would not be treated like a “second-class citizen” but be “equal partners” with the West.
Weeks after the December 1993 elections, Clinton finally addressed the NATO expansion issue personally in a phone call with Yeltsin.
“Can I make one other point?” Clinton asked near the close of their long December 22, 1993 conversation after chewing the fat about elections, the new Russian parliamentary system, economic reforms and Western assistance. “Please do,” Yeltsin said.
“It’s about our foreign policy agenda. I will be in Brussels for the NATO Summit and in Prague before I see you and will want to discuss Russian participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace proposal,” Clinton said.
“I also hope we can have a good discussion in restricted session of the many foreign policy issues, some close to your border, on our agenda. I especially want to discuss this because there is substantial concern in Europe and among your neighbors that the election will results will make Russia more aggressive and intrusive in their affairs,” Clinton noted, for the first time using an argument which has now become a standard NATO justification for the bloc’s expansion – so-called Russian “aggression.”
“I hope we can agree on cooperative efforts to dispel those fears…It will be important to allay concerns by producing concrete movement on Ukraine nuclear issues and also on the Baltics. I don’t know where you are on that, but I think it would be a good way to demonstrate the positive changes you have already brought to Russian foreign policy,” the US president said.
“We are open to this discussion,” Yeltsin responded. “We do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. When I was in Brussels, I met with NATO Secretary General Woerner. We discussed a plan of action for the countries of Eastern Europe to cooperate with NATO in a way that would not be at the expense of Russia and also a plan of action for Russia to join NATO. So I fully agree with you and look forward to meeting with you,” Yeltsin said.
Clinton did not respond directly to Yeltsin’s point about possible Russian membership in the alliance, smoothly shifting the conversation to another topic.
26 September 2021, 14:27 GMT
NATO Expansion ‘Sows Seeds of Mistrust’
By the end of that year, finally fully cottoned on to Washington’s plans to incorporate Eastern Europe, but not Russia, into the bloc, Yeltsin asked Clinton point black at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe summit in December 1994 why the US had chosen to sow “the seeds of mistrust.”
“Europe is in danger of plunging into a cold peace. History demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies of continents and the world community in general can somehow be managed from one single capital,” Yeltsin said.
He issued a similarly blunt warning in May 1995, when Vice President Al Gore was dispatched to Moscow for talks. “I see nothing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed [with NATO expansion, ed.]. How do you think it looks to us if one bloc continues to exist while the Warsaw Pact has been abolished?…Why do you want to do this? We need a new structure for Pan-European security, not old ones! But for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding toward those of Russia – that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people,” Yeltsin said.
Yeltsin repeated his opposition to alliance expansion several times after that. Washington ignored the complaints, formally announcing plans to incorporate Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO in 1997. The expansion, warned against by top US foreign policy minds, including containment doctrine guru George Kennan, laid the foundation for Russian-US distrust, ultimately culminating in the Ukrainian crisis and NATO’s proxy war against Russia using Kiev.
In April 2022 in a column in The Atlantic, Clinton retroactively attempted to whitewash his role in fomenting the conflict in Ukraine, claiming that throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, “we left the door open for Russia’s eventual membership in NATO.”
“The idea that we ignored, disrespected, or tried to isolate Russia is false. Yes, NATO expanded despite Russia’s objections, but expansion was about more than the US relationship with Russia,” Clinton wrote. The former president went on to cite Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine as “proof” that he made the right call, ignoring Washington’s explicit commitment to Moscow not to expand “one inch east” of a reunified Germany in 1990.
NATO’s Expansionism: A Historic Inevitability?
Dr. Matthew Crosston, a professor of national security at Bowie State University, told Sputnik that unfortunately, the palpable positive “energy and excitement” experienced by many Russians and ordinary Americans after the end of the Cold War quickly took a back seat to plans by Washington policymakers to “maximize” as much as possible “the reality of what was considered the greatest historical victory ever achieved by the United States.”
“Everyone can remember the ‘best buddies’ spirit that Clinton and Yeltsin always tried to create whenever they met. But underneath that spirit was still an adamant understanding by American power players that the path forward for Russia really should be not just advised by the United States but perhaps even actually designed and implemented for Russia. This concept – of no longer being enemies but not exactly being equal and independent allies either – has remained for the entire 30 years since that October coup and has always been a source of irritation, conflict, and interference between our two countries,” the academic said.
Yeltsin, Crosston believes, “clearly wanted the best for Russia and wanted to create a new relationship dynamic between the United States and his country,” but soon realized that “the US was not going to work with him to make it possible to craft a truly brand new and profoundly different relationship between the supposedly former rivals.” The former Russian president “truly believed if he open-heartedly embraced a cooperative relationship with America that the US would reciprocate and not take advantage. That belief was unfortunately somewhat naïve, and it was manipulated by some of his closest advisors within his own Kremlin team,” according to the observer.
Instead, Crosston stressed, the US embraced an “unofficial policy” of only engaging with Russia “in as much as it allows America to heavily influence policy choices and political decisions inside of the Kremlin, but not allow that engagement to bring about a real change in how Russia is viewed…America wanted a Russia that was friendly but pliable.”
Ultimately, the academic emphasized that NATO’s prevailing doctrine after the Cold War revolved around the idea of “keeping Russia an enemy,” with the “old way of thinking” causing “the least disruption to existing institutional bureaucracies” in Washington.
“I have called it in my work a ‘Cold War pathology’ or a ‘Cold War residue’ and it became clear, first with Clinton but subsequently deepen[ing] with every president after him, that the American establishment was more comfortable with keeping Russia buried in that Cold War corner than trying to do the hard work of crafting a new relationship between the two rivals. To me, if the end of the Cold War is considered the greatest historical moment of the 20th century, then the failure to truly capitalize on that by creating a new American-Russian relationship is one of the biggest mistakes so far of the 21st century,” Crosston summed up.
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